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Abstract
We investigate the problem of secure message transmission in the pres-
ence of a ‘fully generalised’ adversary, who disrupts and listens to separate
sets of communication wires. We extend previous results by considering
the case when these sets may have arbitrary size, providing necessary and
sufficient conditions for both one-way and two-way communication.
1 Introduction
A sender, S, and a receiver, R, are connected by several parallel communication
wires (these might, for example, represent vertex-disjoint paths from S to R in
some underlying network). We shall sometimes assume that these wires only
permit one-way communication from S to R; other times, we shall assume that
the wires allow two-way communication.
S wishes to transmit a secret numerical message, m, to R. Unfortunately,
an adversary has control of some unknown subset of the wires, meaning that he
can listen to anything transmitted along particular wires and can also disrupt
transmissions so that something different is received.
Our challenge is to design a protocol for S and R to follow that is ‘secure’, in
the sense that it is both (a) ‘reliable’ (R receives m correctly) and (b) ‘private’
(the adversary must not be allowed to learn anything at all about m).
Results for the standard model where the adversary completely controls an
unknown set of k wires (for known k) can be found in [4], both for the case of
one-way and two-way communication wires. In [1] and [3], this work is then
generalised to a model where the adversary chooses between sets of wires of
different sizes.
Another extension that is also discussed in [4] concerns a scenario where the
wires listened to may differ from those that can be disrupted. This work has
connections to problems involving multiple adversaries, where the overall set of
disrupted wires may differ from the set that can be listened to by any one party.
Previous results for this latter model all focus on the case where the set of
wires listened to and the set of wires disrupted both have given sizes. In this
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paper, we now extend this to a ‘fully generalised’ model akin to the work of [1]
and [3], where the adversary chooses between (pairs of) sets of different sizes.
The paper is structured as follows: in Section 2, we summarise the previous
relevant work; in Section 3, we look at the one-way case; and in Sections 4 and 5,
we investigate two particular variants of the two-way case.
2 Summary of Previous Results
In this section, we shall summarise relevant known results. We start (in Sub-
section 2.1) with some basic definitions, before then looking at the cases of a
‘k-adversary’ (Subsection 2.2), a ‘general adversary structure’ (Subsection 2.3)
and a ‘fully generalised adversary’ (Subsection 2.4). In the rest of this paper,
we shall then present new results for this latter case.
2.1 Basic Definitions
In this subsection, we provide some basic definitions concerning the nature of
the adversary and the required communications protocol.
We start with details of the influence of the adversary:
Definition 1 We say that an adversary disrupts a communication wire to
mean that he replaces the transmission on this wire with a new message, so that
the recipient only receives the new version.
We say that an adversary listens to a communication wire to mean that he
hears everything transmitted (by any party) on this wire.
We say that an adversary controls a communication wire to mean that he
can both disrupt and listen to this wire.
Note that we do not assume that an adversary must disrupt all wires under
his control — he may decide to allow some transmissions to pass through un-
altered. Also, unless otherwise stated, we do not distinguish between the case
when the new transmission on a disrupted wire is specifically chosen by the
adversary and the case when the new transmission is random noise.
As mentioned in Section 1, the aim is for a sender S to convey a secret
numerical messagem to a receiverR by using a pre-determined ‘secure’ protocol:
Definition 2 We say that a communications protocol is reliable if R can al-
ways deduce m correctly.
We say that a communications protocol is private if the adversary does not
learn anything at all about m.
We say that a communications protocol is secure if it is both reliable and
private.
We assume throughout that the protocol is also known to the adversary. For
technical reasons, we also implicitly assume that all arithmetic operations are
carried out modulo some publically known large prime.
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Before moving on, let us just mention in passing that there are also interest-
ing probabilistic analogues to our definitions, involved in the study of ‘almost
secure’ message transmission (see, for example, [2], [5], [6] and [7]). However,
this is not to be the focus of the current paper.
2.2 The k-Adversary
In this subsection, we shall discuss the scenario of a ‘k-adversary’, providing
details of results for secure message transmission in both the case when the
communication wires only permit one-way communication from S to R and the
case when the wires allow unlimited two-way communication back and forth
between S and R.
We start with a definition:
Definition 3 A k-adversary can control any set of k communication wires.
This is sometimes also known as a threshold adversary with parameter k.
Throughout this paper, we shall assume that the adversary’s choice of wires
is made before the start of the communications process and then remains fixed.
We also assume that the identity of the chosen wires is unknown to S and R.
The following result provides a complete description of the possibility of
secure message transmission using one-way communication wires:
Theorem 4 (see [4]) In the presence of a k-adversary, one-way secure mes-
sage transmission using n communication wires is possible if and only if n > 3k.
Note that one successful protocol is for S to choose a random degree k
polynomial p(x) satisfying p(0) = m, and transmit p(i) on wire i for all i ∈
{1, 2, . . . , 3k + 1}. We shall use this idea later.
There is also an analogous result concerning two-way communication wires.
Although we now allow unlimited communication through the wires, so that
information can be sent back and forth many times before R eventually obtains
m, it turns out that it suffices just to have two communication rounds (one from
R to S and then one from S to R).
Theorem 5 (see [4]) In the presence of a k-adversary, two-way secure mes-
sage transmission using n communication wires is possible if and only if n > 2k.
Furthermore, when this condition is met, secure message transmission in just
two communication rounds is actually possible.
2.3 The General Adversary Structure
In this subsection, we shall extend the results of Subsection 2.2 to the case
of a ‘general adversary structure’, where the possibilities for the set of wires
controlled by the adversary may differ in size, rather than all having cardinality
k. We shall again see results for both the one-way and two-way cases, but first
we start with an appropriate definition:
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Definition 6 Let A be a collection of sets of communication wires. Then we
say that an adversary has general adversary structure A to mean that the
adversary can control any set of communication wires in A.
For example, if A = {{1, 2, 3}, {1, 2, 4}, {1, 5}} then the adversary would
have a choice between controlling {1, 2, 3} or {1, 2, 4} or {1, 5}. The k-adversary
is consequently the special case where A consists of precisely the sets of size k.
The following result deals with the one-way scenario:
Theorem 7 (see [3]) Let A be a general adversary structure. Then one-way
secure message transmission is possible if and only if no three sets in A cover
all communication wires.
There is also a two-way version:
Theorem 8 (see [1]) Let A be a general adversary structure. Then two-way
secure message transmission is possible if and only if no two sets in A cover all
communication wires.
The proof given in [1] uses induction, and the successful protocol takes |A|−1
communication rounds between S and R, unlike the two-round result of The-
orem 5. In our new work in Sections 3 and 4, we shall use a modified version
of this induction procedure, and in Corollary 16 we shall actually obtain a suc-
cessful two-round protocol for Theorem 8.
2.4 The Fully Generalised Adversary
We shall now further extend the definitions of Subsection 2.3 to deal with the
scenario of a ‘fully generalised’ adversary, where the wires disrupted may differ
from the wires listened to. We shall also provide known one-way and two-way
results for a special case of this type of adversary. In the remainder of the paper,
we shall then extend these results to cover any fully generalised adversary.
We start with a definition:
Definition 9 Given two sets of communication wires D and L (which may or
may not intersect), we say that an adversary controls (D,L) to mean that he
can both disrupt all wires in D and simultaneously listen to all wires in L.
Given a collection A = {(D1, L1), (D2, L2), . . . , (D|A|, L|A|)} of pairs of sets
of communication wires, we say that an adversary is a fully generalised ad-
versary with fully generalised adversary structure A to mean that the
adversary can control any pair (Di, Li) in A.
For example, if A =
{(
{1, 2}, {1, 4}
)
,
(
{1, 2, 3}, {1}
)}
then the adversary
would have a choice between being able to disrupt {1, 2} and also listen to
{1, 4} or being able to disrupt {1, 2, 3} and also listen to {1}. Note that the
general adversary structure discussed in Subsection 2.3 is a special case of the
fully generalised structure where each pair (Di, Li) consists of two identical
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sets. Consequently, the k-adversary is also a special case of the fully generalised
adversary.
Throughout this paper, we shall always assume that our adversary is ‘obliv-
ious’, in the following sense:
Definition 10 We say that a fully generalised adversary is oblivious if he
cannot hear the original message on a disrupted wire unless he happens to also
be listening to that wire.
Note that it was not necessary to distinguish between oblivious and non-
oblivious adversaries in Subsections 2.2 and 2.3, since the adversaries discussed
there would always be listening to any disrupted wires. Observe also that the
non-oblivious case for a fully generalised adversary structureA = {(D1, L1), (D2, L2), . . . , (D|A|, L|A|)}
is essentially the same as the oblivious case for a fully generalised adversary
structure A′ = {(D1, L1 ∪ D1), (D2, L2 ∪ D2), . . . , (D|A|, L|A| ∪ D|A|)}, and so
non-oblivious results can be deduced by studying the oblivious case.
In addition to Definition 10, we shall also now find it necessary to make the
following definition:
Definition 11 We say that an oblivious fully generalised adversary is com-
pletely oblivious if he also cannot hear the new message on a disrupted wire
unless he happens to be listening to that wire.
Note that the completely oblivious case could correspond to random noise
that is not heard by the adversary, while the non-completely oblivious case could
correspond either to a scenario where the new transmission on a disrupted wire
is specifically chosen by the adversary or to a scenario of random noise that is
heard by the adversary.
As mentioned, we shall now provide two known results for the fully gener-
alised adversary, both for the special case when A consists of precisely those
pairs (D,L) for which |D| = d and |L| = l. We start with the one-way case:
Theorem 12 (see [4]) Given fixed constants d and l, let A be the fully gen-
eralised adversary structure consisting of precisely those pairs (D,L) for which
|D| = d and |L| = l, and suppose that the adversary is oblivious. Then one-way
secure message transmission using n communication wires is possible if and only
if n > 2d+ l.
Note that since the communication in Theorem 12 is one-way, it does not
matter whether or not the adversary is completely oblivious.
Observe also that Theorem 12 is a direct extension of Theorem 4, but not
Theorem 7. In Section 3, we shall present a new result that deals with any fully
generalised adversary, thus incorporating both Theorem 7 and Theorem 12.
We first conclude this section with an analogous result to Theorem 12 for
two-way communication:
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Theorem 13 (see [4]) Given fixed constants d and l, let A be the fully gen-
eralised adversary structure consisting of precisely those pairs (D,L) for which
|D| = d and |L| = l, and suppose that the adversary is completely oblivious.
Then two-way secure message transmission using n communication wires is pos-
sible if and only if n > d+max{d, l}. Furthermore, when this condition is met,
secure message transmission in just two communication rounds is actually pos-
sible.
Note that this time we assume that the adversary is completely oblivious.
In Section 5, we shall present new work for the non-completely oblivious case,
obtaining a different result.
Observe also that Theorem 13 is a direct improvement on Theorem 5, but
not Theorem 8. In Section 4, we shall present a new result dealing with any
completely oblivious fully generalised adversary structure, incorporating both
Theorem 8 and Theorem 13.
3 One-Way Secure Message Transmission
In Section 1, we gave details of previous relevant work on secure message trans-
mission. In the remainder of this paper, we shall now present new results,
starting here with the one-way case.
Recall that we have already seen a necessary and sufficient condition for
successful one-way communication in the presence of a k-adversary (Theorem 4),
as well as two separate extensions of this involving a general adversary structure
(Theorem 7) and a special case of the fully generalised adversary (Theorem 12).
In Theorem 14, we shall now unify these latter two results to deal with any fully
generalised adversary:
Theorem 14 Let A = {(D1, L1), (D2, L2), . . . , (D|A|, L|A|)} be a fully gener-
alised adversary structure, and suppose that the adversary is oblivious. 1 Then
one-way secure message transmission is possible if and only if there exist no Di,
Dj and Lk (including the possibility that k equals i or j) such that Di∪Dj ∪Lk
covers all communication wires.
Proof Let us begin by assuming that there exist no Di, Dj and Lk such that
Di ∪Dj ∪ Lk covers all communication wires, and let us provide a protocol for
one-way secure message transmission.
We shall proceed by using induction on |A|. The inductive step will require
|A| ≥ 4, and so the base case will be |A| = 3, i.e.A = {(D1, L1), (D2, L2), (D3, L3)}
(note that this will then also deal with the case |A| < 3, since we could take
some of the (Di, Li) to be (∅, ∅)).
Base case (|A| = 3): By the conditions of the theorem, there exist (not
necessarily distinct) wires w1 /∈ (D1 ∪ D2 ∪ L1), w2 /∈ (D1 ∪ D2 ∪ L2) and
1As with Theorem 12, it does not matter whether or not the adversary is completely
oblivious.
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w3 /∈ (D1 ∪ D2 ∪ L3). Let S choose two random numbers r1 and r2, and send
r1 on wire w1, r2 on wire w2 and m − r1 − r2 on wire w3. Observe that m
will still be a secret to the adversary, since he will only be able to listen to at
most two of the transmissions, and that R will be able to compute m correctly
unless the adversary chooses (D3, L3). Let S then also use the same procedure
(with different random numbers) with wires not in D1 ∪ D3, and then with
wires not in D2 ∪ D3. Each time, m will remain private, and R will be able
to compute it correctly unless the adversary chooses (D2, L2) or, respectively,
(D1, L1). Hence, in total, R will compute three values, at least two of which
will be the same — this value must be m.
Inductive step (|A| = l > 3): Suppose now that a successful protocol has
been established whenever |A| < l, and let us deal with the case when |A| = l.
Let us create four new adversary structures A1, A2, A3 and A4 such that
Aj = A \ (Dj , Lj) (i.e. A1 = {(D2, L2), (D3, L3), . . . , (Dl, Ll)}, etc). Since
|Aj | = l − 1 for all j, we know by the induction hypothesis that for each Aj
there exists a successful protocol ψj . It is crucial to note that if ψj is used
in the presence of the complete adversary structure A, then transmission will
be secure unless the adversary chooses (Dj , Lj). Hence, if S chooses a random
number r and, for each j ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}, uses ψj to transmit m + jr, then all
but at most one of these four transmissions will be secure. Thus, as with the
successful four wire protocol in the presence of a 1-adversary (see the comment
following Theorem 4), R can then deduce m without the adversary gaining any
knowledge himself.
Let us now look at the converse direction. Suppose that there exist Di, Dj
and Lk such that Di∪Dj∪Lk covers all communication wires, and, with the aim
of achieving a contradiction, let us also suppose that there exists a successful
protocol, ψ, for one-way secure message transmission.
Note that the information transmitted by S through the wires depends not
only on the message and the protocol, but also perhaps on various random
choices that S has to take as part of the protocol (e.g. in the third paragraph of
this proof, S had to choose random numbers r1 and r2). Let us suppose that S
wishes to send a message m1 using protocol ψ, and that he also makes random
choices C1 as part of the protocol.
Consider the information transmitted through the wires in Lk. By privacy,
this information must be compatible with all possible messages, i.e. given any
possible message m2 there must exist random choices C2 such that sending
message m2 using protocol ψ with random choices C2 results in exactly the
same transmissions in Lk as sending message m1 using protocol ψ with random
choices C1.
One possibility for the adversary (let us call this “Possibility A”) is to choose
(Di, Li) and disruptDi in such a way that the information received byR through
the wires in Di happens to be exactly what would be transmitted by S if S was
sending m1 using protocol ψ with random choices C1.
Another possiblity for the adversary (let us call this “Possibility B”) is to
instead choose (Dj , Lj) and disrupt Dj \Di in such a way that the information
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received by R through the wires in Dj \Di happens to be exactly what would
be transmitted by S if S was sending m2 using protocol ψ with random choices
C2.
Note that if Possibility A occurs and S sends m2 using protocol ψ with
random choices C2, then R will receive exactly the same transmissions as if
Possibility B occurs and S sends m1 using protocol ψ with random choices C1.
Hence, it will be impossible for R to determine the message reliably, and so we
have obtained our desired contradiction.
4 Two-Way Secure Message Transmission with
a Completely Oblivious Adversary
In Section 3, we presented a necessary and sufficient condition for one-way secure
message transmission in the presence of an oblivious adversary, and noted that it
did not matter whether or not the adversary is completely oblivious. We shall
now proceed with the two-way case, for which we shall find that we do now
need to make such a distinction. Consequently, this section will focus on the
completely oblivious scenario, while Section 5 will concern the non-completely
oblivious analogue.
Recall that we have already seen a necessary and sufficient condition with the
k-adversary (Theorem 5), as well as extensions of this to the general adversary
(Theorem 8) and a special case of the fully generalised adversary (Theorem 13).
In Theorem 15, we shall now combine these latter two results to include any
fully generalised adversary.
Furthermore, the successful protocol will only take two communication rounds,
allowing us to obtain (in Corollary 16) an improvement to the protocol given in
the proof of Theorem 8.
Theorem 15 Let A = {(D1, L1), (D2, L2), . . . , (D|A|, L|A|)} be a fully gener-
alised adversary structure, and suppose that the adversary is completely oblivi-
ous. Then two-way secure message transmission is possible if and only if there
exist no Di and Dj such that Di ∪Dj covers all communication wires and no
Di and Lj (including the possibility that i equals j) such that Di ∪ Lj covers
all communication wires. Furthermore, when these conditions are met, secure
message transmission in just two communication rounds is actually possible.
Proof Let us start by using induction to provide a successful two-round proto-
col for when the adversary structure does satisfy the conditions of the theorem.
As in the proof of Theorem 14, the inductive step will require |A| ≥ 4 and so
the base case will be |A| = 3 (recall that this automatically incorporates the
case |A| < 3).
Base case (|A| = 3):
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By the conditions of the theorem, there exist (not necessarily distinct) wires
w1,1 /∈ (D1 ∪ L1), w1,2 /∈ (D1 ∪ L2), w1,3 /∈ (D1 ∪ L3), w2,1 /∈ (D2 ∪ L1),
w2,2 /∈ (D2 ∪ L2), w2,3 /∈ (D2 ∪ L3), w3,1 /∈ (D3 ∪ L1), w3,2 /∈ (D3 ∪ L2),
w3,3 /∈ (D3 ∪ L3), w4,1 /∈ (D1 ∪D2), w4,2 /∈ (D1 ∪D3) and w4,3 /∈ (D2 ∪D3).
Step 1: Let R choose four random degree-one polynomials p1(x), p2(x),
p3(x) and p4(x). For each polynomial pi(x), let R then also choose six random
numbers ri,j,k, where j ∈ {1, 2, 3} and k ∈ {1, 2} (so there will be twenty-four
random integers in total). Then, for each polynomial pi(x) and all j ∈ {1, 2, 3},
let R send ri,j,1 on wire wj,1, ri,j,2 on wire wj,2, pi(j) − ri,j,1 − ri,j,2 on wire
wj,3, and pi(4) on all three wires w4,1, w4,2 and w4,3.
Note that, for each polynomial pi(x) and all j ∈ {1, 2, 3}, pi(j) will be
equal to the sum of the transmissions on wires wj,1, wj,2 and wj,3. Hence,
(i) pi(1) cannot be eavesdropped and can only be disrupted if the adversary
chooses (D2, L2) or (D3, L3), (ii) pi(2) cannot be eavesdropped and can only be
disrupted if the adversary chooses (D1, L1) or (D3, L3), and (iii) pi(3) cannot
be eavesdropped and can only be disrupted if the adversary chooses (D1, L1) or
(D2, L2). Additionally, observe that (iv) pi(4) cannot be disrupted (since it can
be deduced by majority vote), but can be eavesdropped.
Let pi(j) denote the value of pi(j) received by S (so pi(4) = pi(4)).
Step 2, case (A): If there exists an i such that {pi(1), pi(2), pi(3), pi(4)} is
consistent with a degree-one polynomial, then note that this polynomial must
be pi(x) and must still be unknown to the adversary, so S can simply transmit
i and m+ pi(0) ‘publically’ (i.e. on wires w4,1, w4,2 and w4,3, with R then using
majority vote) and R can deduce m. 2
Step 2, case (B) (to be used if the conditions of case (A) do not hold):
If there exists an i such that no three values of {pi(1), pi(2), pi(3), pi(4)} are
consistent with the same degree-one polynomial, then this means that two of
the values in {pi(1), pi(2), pi(3)} have been disrupted. Hence, S can transmit
i, pi(1), pi(2) and pi(3) ‘publically’, allowing R to deduce exactly which set
the adversary chose. S can then select another polynomial pj(x), compute
the three possibilities p′j(0), p
′′
j (0) and p
′′′
j (0) for pj(0) (depending on whether
pj(1) = pj(1), pj(2) = pj(2) or pj(3) = pj(3), respectively) and ‘publically’ send
j, m+ p′j(0), m+ p
′′
j (0) and m+ p
′′′
j (0), allowing R to deduce m.
Step 2, case (C) (to be used if the conditions of cases (A) and (B) do not
hold): Suppose that for all i, there exist exactly three values of {pi(1), pi(2), pi(3), pi(4)}
that are consistent with the same degree-one polynomial. Observe that these
three values must include pi(4), and so the value not included must be either
pi(1), pi(2) or pi(3), i.e. three alternatives. Since there are four values of i,
the pigeon-hole principle then implies that there must exist two values of i,
let us call these i1 and i2, that share the ‘same’ alternative — without loss of
2Clearly, pi(x) will still be unknown to the adversary, but note that this would not neces-
sarily be the case if he were not completely oblivious and the new values on disrupted wires
were known to him. For example, it would be possible to have happened to have disrupted
pi(1), say, with the correct value and to have also eavesdropped pi(4), in which case the very
fact that S is transmitting m+ pi(0) at all (rather than following the procedures of cases (B)
or (C)) would then allow the adversary to deduce what had occurred!
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generality let us suppose that this is the first alternative, i.e. pi1(1) and pi2(1).
Then we know that in polynomial pi1(x), either (a) pi1(1) was disrupted or
(b) pi1(2) and pi1(3) were both disrupted. Similarly, in polynomial pi2(x), either
(a) pi2(1) was disrupted or (b) pi2(2) and pi2(3) were both disrupted. Crucially,
note (from the second paragraph of Step 1) that (a) is true for pi1(x) if and only
if (a) is also true for pi2(x).
Hence, if S transmits i1, pi1(1), pi1(2) and pi1(3) ‘publically’, this actually
allows R to deduce whether (a) or (b) is true for pi2(x). S can then compute the
two possibilities p′i2(0) and p
′′
i2
(0) for pi2(0) (depending on whether (a) is true
or (b) is true) and also ‘publically’ send i2, m+ p
′
i2
(0) and m+ p′′i2(0), enabling
R to then deduce m.
Inductive step (|A| = l ≥ 4):
Suppose now that a successful protocol has been established whenever |A| <
l, and let us deal with the case when |A| = l.
As in the proof of Theorem 14, let us consider the following four adversary
structures of size l−1: A1 = A\(D1, L1), A2 = A\(D2, L2), A3 = A\(D3, L3),
and A4 = A \ (D4, L4). By the induction hypothesis, for each Aj there exists
a successful two-round protocol ψj (with one round from R to S and then one
round from S to R). As in the proof of Theorem 14, note that if ψj is used in
the presence of the complete adversary structure A, then transmission will be
secure unless the adversary chooses (Dj , Lj). Hence, if protocol ψj is used to
transmitm+jr for all j ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} (where r is some random integer chosen by
S and m is the secret message), then all but at most one of these transmissions
will be secure. Thus, as in the proof of Theorem 14, R can then deduce m
without the adversary gaining any knowledge himself.
Now we shall show that secure message transmission is not possible at all (in
any number of rounds) if either of the conditions of the theorem are not met.
First, let us deal with the case when there exist Di and Dj such that Di∪Dj
covers all communication wires. The proof follows the same argument as that
given for Theorem 5.2 in [4] (our Theorem 13).
Suppose, aiming for a contradiction, that there exists a successful protocol,
and let m1 and m2 be two potential messages. Now consider the first round of
transmissions sent by S — suppose that αk is transmitted on wire k if m1 is
the message and S makes random choices C1 and that βk is transmitted on wire
k if m2 is the message and S makes random choices C2.
One possible strategy for the adversary (let us call this “Possibility A”) is
to choose (Di, Li) and disrupt all wires in Di, with the possibility that the new
transmission on wire k (for all k ∈ Di) is now βk. Similarly, another possible
strategy for the adversary (“Possibility B”) is to choose (Dj , Lj) and disrupt all
wires in Dj \Di, with the possibility that the new transmission on wire k (for
all k ∈ Dj \Di) is now αk.
Note that if the message is m1, S makes random choices C1, and Possibility
A occurs, then R will receive exactly the same transmissions as if the message
is m2, S makes random choices C2, and Possibility B occurs. Hence, the next
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round of transmissions sent by R would have to be the same in both cases.
By applying this same argument to every pair of transmission rounds, we
see that it is possible for the adversary to force the protocol to run forever
without R ever being able to deduce the message, and so we achieve our desired
contradiction.
Now let us deal with the case when there exist Di and Lj (including the
possibility that i equals j) such that Di ∪ Lj covers all communication wires.
Again, the proof follows the same argument as that given for Theorem 5.2 in
[4].
Suppose, aiming for a contradiction, that there exists a successful protocol,
and let m and m′ be potential messages. Let αlk denote the transmission on
wire k in round l when m is the message, random choices CS and CR are made
by S and R, respectively, and no wires are ever disrupted. By privacy, there
must exist random choices C′S and C
′
R such that if m
′ is the message, choices
C′S and C
′
R are made, and no wires are ever disrupted, then exactly the same
transmissions in Lj are made. Hence, if we let β
l
k denote the transmissions on
wire k in round l when m′ is the message (given choices C′S and C
′
R and no
disruption of wires), then we have βlk = α
l
k for all l for all k ∈ Lj.
Without loss of generality, let us suppose that the first round of transmissions
is from S to R, and let us consider the scenario when m is the message, S makes
random choices CS , and R makes random choices C
′
R.
A strategy for the adversary would be to disrupt all wires in Di, with the
possibility that all transmissions over these wires could be altered to β1k. Hence,
since R also receives β1k (= α
1
k) over all wires in Lj (and Di ∪ Lj covers every
wire), R would then respond by transmitting β2k on wire k for all k in round
two. One option now for the adversary would be to again disrupt all wires in
Di, with the possibility that all R’s transmissions could be altered to α
2
k. Note
that S would then respond by transmitting α3k on wire k for all k in round three.
Continuing in this manner, we can observe that R would ultimately think that
message m′ had been sent, which would be wrong.
As noted, Theorem 15 provides a successful protocol in just two communi-
cation rounds when the conditions are met. Consequently, by taking Di = Li
for all i, we also obtain the following two-round result for the case of a general
adversary structure (improving on the |A|− 1 round protocol given in the proof
of Theorem 8).
Corollary 16 Let A be a general adversary structure, and suppose that no two
sets in A cover all communication wires. Then secure message transmission in
just two communication rounds is possible.
11
5 Two-Way Secure Message Transmission with
a Non-Completely Oblivious Adversary
In Section 4, we gave a necessary and sufficient condition for two-way secure
message transmission in the presence of a completely oblivious adversary, and
noted that only two communication rounds are required whenever successful
protocols are possible. In this section, we shall now look at the case of an ad-
versary that is not completely oblivious, providing (in Theorem 17) a necessary
and sufficient condition for the existence of two-round protocols, which we shall
see differs from the equivalent result for the completely oblivious case.
Theorem 17 Let A = {(D1, L1), (D2, L2), . . . , (D|A|, L|A|)} be a fully gener-
alised adversary structure, and suppose that the adversary is oblivious, but not
completely oblivious. Then two-way secure message transmission in just two
communication rounds is possible if and only if there exist no Di, Dj and Lj
such that Di ∪Dj ∪ Lj covers all communication wires.
Proof Let us start by showing that a successful two-round protocol exists when
the adversary structure satisfies the conditions of the theorem.
It will prove helpful to consider the adversary structure A′ = {(D1, L1 ∪
D1), (D2, L2 ∪ D2), . . . , (D|A|, L|A| ∪ D|A|)}. Note that any protocol that is
successful in the presence of A′ must also be successful in the presence of A,
since A′ is stronger. Furthermore, note that with A′ it is irrelevant whether the
adversary is defined to be completely oblivious or not (or even whether he is
oblivious at all), since all disrupted wires will also be listened to.
Hence, by Theorem 15, a successful two-round protocol in the presence of A′
(and consequently A) is possible if there exist no i and j such that Di∪{Lj∪Dj}
covers all communication wires.
Let us now show that a successful two-round protocol is not possible if the
conditions of the theorem are not met.
The proof will be by contradiction, so let us suppose that there does exist a
successful two-round protocol. To start with, consider the case when no wires
are disrupted. Given a message m and random choices CR and CS made by R
and S, let us represent the transmissions sent in round 1 (by R) by the vectors
α1, β1 and γ1, where α1, β1 and γ1 denote the transmissions sent on wires in
Di \ Lj, Dj \ (Di ∪ Lj) and Lj, respectively. Similarly, let us represent the
transmissions sent in round 2 (by S) by α2, β2 and γ2.
Now consider the possibility that the adversary could choose (Dj , Lj) and
happen to disrupt all wires in Dj \ (Di ∪ Lj) with the correct values β1 and
β2. Privacy then implies that, for any message m
′, there must exist random
choices C′R and C
′
S and vectors α1
′, β1
′, α2
′, β2
′ such that the transmissions sent
in round 1 (by R) are α′
1
, β′
1
and γ1, the transmissions received (by S) are α
′
1
,
β1 and γ1, the transmissions sent in round 2 (by S) are α
′
2
, β′
2
and γ2, and the
transmissions received (by R) are α′2, β2 and γ2.
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One possible strategy for the adversary (let us call this “Possibility A”) is
to choose (Di, Li) and happen to disrupt the wires in Di \Lj with α′1 in round
1 and α2 in round 2. Another strategy (“Possibility B”) is to instead choose
(Dj , Lj) and make no disruptions in round 1, but happen to disrupt the wires
in Dj \ (Di ∪ Lj) with β
′
2 in round 2.
Now consider the possibility that R makes choices CR and transmits α1, β1
and γ1 in round 1.
Under Possibility A, S will receive α′
1
, β1 and γ1. If S wishes to send m
′
and makes random choices C′S , then he will transmit α
′
2
, β′
2
and γ2, and R will
receive α2, β
′
2 and γ2.
Under Possibility B, S will instead receive α1, β1 and γ1. If S wishes to send
m and makes random choices CS , then he will transmit α2, β2 and γ2, and R
will again receive α2, β
′
2 and γ2.
Hence, R will be unable to distinguish between m and m′, and so the pro-
tocol is not successful.
6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have investigated secure message transmission in the presence
of a fully generalised adversary, where the set of communication wires disrupted
may differ from those listened to and may be of any size.
We have extended previous results into a complete description of necessary
and sufficient conditions for both the one-way case (Theorem 14) and the two-
way case with a completely oblivious adversary (Theorem 15).
In the additional case of an oblivious adversary that is not completely obliv-
ious, we have presented a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of
a protocol that uses only two communication rounds (Theorem 17), and seen
that this differs from with a completely oblivious adversary.
The remaining issue for the additional case consequently concerns resolving
the exact conditions under which any successful protocol (perhaps using more
than two rounds) is obtainable. Here, a sufficient condition is clearly given by
the two-round result of Theorem 17, while a necessary condition is implied by
the completely oblivious case of Theorem 15. It would be interesting to try to
close this gap.
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